Mainstream social psychology focuses on how people characteristically violate norms of action through social misbehaviors such as conformity with false majority judgments, destructive obedience, and failures to help those in need. Likewise, they are seen to violate norms of reasoning through cognitive errors such as misuse of social information, self-enhancement, and an over-readiness to attribute dispositional characteristics. The causes of this negative research emphasis include the apparent informativeness of norm violation, the status of good behavior and judgment as unconfirmable null (...) hypotheses, and the allure of counter-intuitive findings. The shortcomings of this orientation include frequently erroneous imputations of error, findings of mutually contradictory errors, incoherent interpretations of error, an inability to explain the sources of behavioral or cognitive achievement, and the inhibition of generalized theory. Possible remedies include increased attention to the complete range of behavior and judgmental accomplishment, analytic reforms emphasizing effect sizes and Bayesian inference, and a theoretical paradigm able to account for both the sources of accomplishment and of error. A more balanced social psychology would yield not only a more positive view of human nature, but also an improved understanding of the bases of good behavior and accurate judgment, coherent explanations of occasional lapses, and theoretically grounded suggestions for improvement. Key Words: Bayesian inference; biases; normative models; personality; positive psychology; rationality; reasoning; social behavior; social judgment; social psychology. (shrink)

The base rate literature has an opposite twin in the social psychological literature on stereotypes, which concludes that people use their preexisting beliefs about probabilistic category attributes too much, rather than not enough. This ironic discrepancy arises because beliefs about category attributes enhance accuracy when the beliefs are accurate and diminish accuracy when they are not. To determine the accuracy of base rate/stereotype beliefs requires research that addresses specific content.

The target article tends to conflate self-deception and self-enhancement, but biased self-presentation can be negative as well as positive. Self-deceiving self-diminishers may be depressed and non-self-deceiving self-diminishers may project false modesty. The article's otherwise brilliant argument for the advantages of self-deceptive self-enhancement for deceiving others may underemphasize the risks it entails for poor decision making.

The target article's finding of stable and general individual differences in solving of problems in heuristics-and-biases experiments is fundamentally subversive to the Meliorist research program's attention-getting claim that human thought is “systematically irrational.” Since some people get these problems right, studies of heuristics and biases may reduce to repeated demonstrations that difficult questions are hard to solve.

The general principle behind the effects of nested sets on the use of base rates, we believe, is that the mind is prepared to take in Without any need to assume two cognitive systems, this principle explains how the proper use of base rates can be facilitated and also accounts for occasions when base rates are overused.

Many commentators agree with our view that the problem-oriented approach to social psychology has not fulfilled its promise, and they suggest new research directions that may contribute to the maturation of the field. Others suggest that social psychology is not as focused on negative phenomena as we claim, or that a negative focus does indeed lay the most efficient path toward a general understanding of social cognition and behavior. In this response, we organize the comments thematically, discuss them in light (...) of our original exposition, and reiterate that we seek not a disproportionately positive social psychology but a balanced field that addresses the range of human performance. (shrink)

Social reality of a group emerges from interpersonal perceptions and beliefs put to action under a host of environmental conditions. By extending the study of fast-and-frugal heuristics, we view social perceptions as judgment tools and assert that perceptions are ecologically rational to the degree that they adapt to the social reality. We maintain that the veracity of both stereotypes and base rates, as judgment tools, can be determined solely by accuracy research.